COMMANDERS DIGEST

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

FREEDOM MEDAL—President Lyndon B. Johnson presents the Medal of Freedom to departing Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in ceremonies in the East Room of the White House Feb. 28.

President, Services Honor McNamara

As a parting tribute for seven years of dedicated public service as Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara received the Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award, and a Distinguished Service Medal from each of the Military Services.

President Johnson presented Mr. McNamara with the Medal of Freedom at a White House ceremony, Feb. 28. The following day, he attended a Pentagon ceremony where the Distinguished Service Medals were presented. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces he had signed the citation accompanying the medals. Mr. McNamara becomes President of the World Bank April 1.

On March 1, Chief Justice Earl Warren administered the oath to Clark Clifford as the Nation's ninth Secretary of Defense. The ceremony took place at the White House.

The citation accompanying the Medal of Freedom read, in part:

". . . For seven years you have administered our complex defense establishment, unifying our strength so that we might respond effectively wherever the security of our free world was challenged. A brilliant analyst, a modern administrator, you have brought a new dimension to defense planning and to decision-making.

"You have grasped the urgent social crisis of our time, the awakening of hope among the world's poor. You have understood that while freedom depends on strength; strength itself

(Continued on page 4)

Defense Directive Explains Policy On Bond Campaigns

Department of Defense Directive 5035.6 has been distributed to all DOD components reemphasizing that purchase of U.S. Savings Bonds must be on a voluntary basis and that any practice that involves coercion is in direct contravention of Executive policy.

Encouragement of DOD personnel to purchase U.S. Savings Bonds is a year-round effort. However, whether a person buys bonds, as well as the amount he buys, is entirely up to the individual, the directive states.

The policy of DOD is to present the case for bonds on its merits, indicating what DOD personnel as individuals need to do in order to join the program.

The Jan. 26, 1968 directive explains that there is a difference between persuasion and coercion—and between promotion and pressure. The difference lies in the presence or absence of threats, stated or implied.

The terms "coerce" or "coercion" as used in the directive include: the use of moral force to compel a person to act or assent; threats of reprisal, or recourse to retaliatory acts or practices to compel a person to act or assent; or comparable acts or practices, direct or indirect, calculated to force individual purchase of U.S. Savings Bonds on an involuntary basis.

To assure voluntarism and preclude coercion, direct or indirect:

- A dollar goal or "quota" may never be assigned to an individual under any Savings Bond Program or Campaign.
- While there may be percentage

(Continued on page 4)

Gen. Holloway Charts Future of Close Air Support

Close air support for the Army is a vital mission and according to Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, "There is no mission that the Air Force will continue to pursue with greater determination and enthusiasm."

Speaking at the Florida West Coast Air Force Association meeting in Tampa, Fla., Gen. Holloway gave this estimate of future developments in close air support:

"Requirements for close air support are defined primarily by the force to be supported—the Army. Concepts and doctrine are hammered out jointly by Air Force and Army people, with much of that process taking place at U.S. Strike Command Headquarters. From there it is the job of the Air Force, and they must do the job at the lowest possible cost.

"One of the most significant military developments of recent years has been the Army's use of the helicopter to give its combat elements greater mobility. The value of this air mobility concept has been proved in Vietnam, and its applicability to other combat situations can be seen quite readily. Recent Army mobility practices affect Air Force responsibilities for close air support, in both quality and amount.

"The very great advantages of enhanced ground force mobility have been achieved at the cost of some reduction in the fire power of Army combat forces, and in their staying power for sustained operations. Hence, there has been a requirement for more close air support in sustained operations than in the past. It may increase even more in the future. We believe it will, and that a specialized close support aircraft will be needed to provide a high volume of close support fire power.

"On the qualitative side, close air support needs of air mobile Army formations present new requirements that differ more in degree than in nature. Hence, new tactical aircraft must combine a number of characters better than any single tactical aircraft does today. I have in mind:



Gen. Holloway

"First, instant response from any type of crude airfield.

"Second, reduced vulnerability to enemy fire.

"Third, a high maneuverability at low speed in order to suppress ground fire and otherwise protect the Army's rotary wing aircraft, and to hit targets in mountain pockets or valleys that are hard for a very high speed aircraft to get at.

"Fourth, a fairly high top speed—460 to 480 knots—for quick response and evading enemy fire.

"Fifth, relatively low cost and high payload that combine to give a lower cost per ton of ordnance delivered on target."

Regarding an aircraft to meet this mission requirement, Gen. Holloway said, "The Air Force, with Army participation, has initiated concept formulation studies on an aircraft—the A-X—which will include all of these characteristics. We see it as a relatively simple, rugged attack aircraft that can find targets in bad weather and deliver weapons with great accuracy using simple fire control systems."

He went on to explain:

The A-X could be built with existing, tested technology. This advantage should reduce the development lead time to about three years from production go-ahead and avoid the risk of presently undeveloped systems. In the meantime, we have two good and inexpensive close support aircraft that are well-adapted to newer Army requirements at the lower end of the performance scale; that is, for helicopter escort and anti-personnel fire support for airborne assaults. These are the propeller-driven A-1, which has done yeoman service throughout the Vietnam war, and the A-37, an attack version of the T-37 jet trainer. Joining them in the future will be the A-7D which has many of the characteristics we are seeking in the A-X, but not its short field take-off and landing, and survivability.

Tactics and technology are extremely dynamic things. We know the A-X will not be the end of the line by any means. For the mid-1970s, a vertical take-off, or very short take-off and landing aircraft may be necessary to meet the Army's close air support requirements.

Gen. Holloway gave this conclusion on where the Air Force stands today in close air support:

- Behind us lies a half-century of achievement, from dropping a hand-held bomb into the trenches of World War I, to the 50-foot bomb lines of Vietnam.

- Before us is the technical and professional capacity to give the ground force precise, responsive fire power support around the clock, in good weather or bad; before us is the ability to meet, at minimum cost and maximum efficiency, any new requirements that are created by the Army's organizational and tactical innovations and proliferations.

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THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES — RED CHINA*

Last year I noted our previous belief that the leadership of Red China was strong and united had proven to be erroneous. The course of events in mainland China during the past 12 months has borne out the assumption we made then that the political turmoil would continue. Civil disturbances and armed clashes have occurred throughout the length and breadth of Red China, many involving the Army itself. Industrial production and transportation have been disrupted, the educational process has been almost completely halted and government administration at all levels has been severely weakened.

What had apparently transpired was an attempted revolution within a revolution. Concerned about flagging revolutionary spirit in the government and party structures, and concerned that future generations would lose sight of "true" Communist goals, [Chairman] Mao [Tse-Tung] set out to conduct a massive housecleaning.

Mao Unleashes Red Guards

When existing mechanisms proved inadequate, he apparently decided to fashion a new instrument, the Red Guards, and set them loose against the Communist bureaucracy, the very people responsible for the administration of day-to-day affairs of the nation. These people tend to give priority to getting the job done rather than to politics and ideology.

The failure of the Great Leap Forward, which had become clearly evident by 1960-61, apparently convinced the bureaucracy that a more pragmatic approach to China's economic problems was urgently needed. This approach necessarily involved the relaxation of some of the dogma favored by Mao and a return to what might be called "quasi-capitalistic" techniques such as the reestablishment of private agricultural plots in the rural areas and the provision of material incentives for the industrial workers in the cities.

It now seems clear that the issue has not been resolved. Mao has succeeded in damaging the Communist bureaucracy, but has neither destroyed it nor transformed it into an effective instrument of his own policy. Administrative control over the nation has been seriously weakened, but the Red Guards proved unable to displace the bureaucracy. The Army has been called upon to reestablish order in cities and to maintain production schedules in factories, in mines and even on the farms.

Nevertheless, clashes between the contending factions continue. The economy and the educational system are still in disarray. Once again, Mao has demonstrated that it is easier to create chaos than to reestablish order. Even if the leadership is reunited, which scarcely seems possible, it will no doubt take many months, if not years, to repair the damage that Mao's cultural revolution has wrought within mainland China.

But the damage was by no means limited to the domestic scene; the cultural revolution has also dealt Red China's foreign policy a severe blow. Its prestige within the Communist camp has declined precipitously, in most instances to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Its relations with the rest of the world are at their lowest ebb. Indeed, Red China in the past year has managed to antagonize most nations with which it still maintains diplomatic relations. Most of its ambassadors have been recalled to Peking, as part of the Great Cultural Revolution, while the Chinese diplomatic missions abroad have ineffectively marked time.

Sooner or later the present leadership, whatever its complexion, will pass from the scene. It is by no means certain what such a development would mean to the present alignment of the world. A more moderate regime in China could result in a relaxation of relations with the outside world, including the United States, or it could mean a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union, or possibly both. Even the second, however might prove to be of advantage to the outside world—if an increasingly moderate viewpoint prevails within the Soviet leadership. In that event the Soviet Union could serve as a moderating influence on Red China. If a more militant approach is adopted by the Soviet Union, however, a *rapprochement* with Red China could confront the Free World with a new and even more severe threat.

Support of Aggression

Meanwhile, we can assume that Red China will continue to support North Vietnam's aggression against South Vietnam and Laos as well as the present low-keyed but continuing insurrections against Thailand and Burma. China may also keep up its pressure on India, using a potential military threat along the northern border combined with propaganda and subversion within the country. Elsewhere in the world the Red Chinese drive has slowed and is not likely to recover its former momentum until the internal leadership issue is settled and the foreign policy line is clarified.

In any event, a mainland China with a population approaching 800 million, a military establishment of some three million men and a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons will be a power to be reckoned with in the 1970s. In its dealings with the Peking regime, the United States will be concerned to stress the common interest we share in avoiding war, as with every other power, and will hope that a dialogue of mutual interest can be initiated and expanded, while we continue to try to deter direct or indirect Chinese aggressions against her neighbors.

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* *Excerpts from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's recent annual Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee.*

Savings Bond Campaigns

(Continued from Page 1)

participation or comparable goals for the over-all Savings Bond Program or Campaign, assigned personnel should be advised of those goals in language which makes it scrupulously clear that these goals are not "quotas" and should not be confused or interpreted as "quotas" for any individual, organization, or station.

• Lists or rosters reflecting by name the participation or non-participation in the program of assigned personnel may be used for internal administrative purposes only. They may not be publicly posted, displayed, circulated or otherwise employed in a manner calculated to bring pressure on any individual to buy bonds.

• It is approved practice for commanders, organization heads, and other management officials to call their assigned DOD personnel together to explain to them the importance and benefits of the Savings Bond Program. However, these management officials, supervisors, campaign workers or others responsible for the program, must scrupulously avoid any action or practice, direct or indirect, calculated to impose coercive pressure to induce individual purchase of Savings Bonds.

• Specific reference to the fact that an individual purchases or does not purchase Savings Bonds shall not be included in the effectiveness or efficiency reports of the individual concerned.

• Pay allotments for the purchase of Savings Bonds under the provisions of DOD Directive 1418.4 and 7330.1 (references (c) and (d)), and related directives, are entirely optional and voluntary. The individual has the right at any time to request cancellation of his Savings Bond payroll deductions. Action on such a request shall not be contingent upon personal contact between the member and his commander, supervisor, local Savings Bond campaign worker, or any individual, for the purpose of acquainting the member with the advantages of the Savings Bond Program, inquiring into the reasons for the request or similar purposes.

• The granting of special favors, privileges or entitlements, such as special pass or leave privileges, as an inducement to purchase U.S. Savings Bonds constitutes coercive practice. Establishment of an express or implied requirement to purchase Savings Bonds as a condition precedent to normal career progression or to the granting of normal privileges and entitlements, or the express or implied denial or threat of denial of such privileges and entitlements or normal career progression to those individuals who do not buy bonds, is equally reprehensible and violates both the letter and the spirit of this directive.

The term "DOD personnel" as used in the Directive includes all uniformed members of the Military Departments and all civilian employees of the Department of Defense.

President Johnson Appoints Gen. Maxwell Taylor Chairman of Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

President Johnson has appointed General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.), as Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to succeed Clark M. Clifford who became Secretary of Defense March 1.

Gen. Taylor

Gen. Taylor was initially appoint as a member of the President's Fo eign Intelligence Advisory Boa May 4, 1961 and served on the Bo until June 30, 1961, when he was called to active military service.

Following service as the Milita Advisor to the President, Chairm of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ge Taylor was reappointed to the Boa on May 23, 1965, and has serv since.

In announcing Gen. Taylor's a pointment as the new Chairman of t Board, President Johnson expres his satisfaction with the valuable co tributions made by the Board in pr viding independent assessments of t over-all foreign intelligence effort.

The President emphasized that will continue to look to Gen. Tayl and the members of the Board f objective appraisals and advice co cerning the activities of our intell gence agencies.

McNamara Honors

(Continued from page 1)

depends on the determination of fre people. . . ."

The citation accompanying the Di tinguished Service Medal said, fo seven years as Secretary of Defens Mr. McNamara has given towerin leadership to the defense of th United States.

The citation continued, in part: "I these years, hazards in Europe, th Caribbean, the Middle East and Southeast Asia—as great and diver as any in our history—have threat ened the Republic. During this time he has built our Nation's forces to pinnacle of new strength and effici ency. This has been done in a perio of unique technological change an varied political demands. . . . His name ranks with his great predeces sors in this century, Henry L. Stim son and George C. Marshall."

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